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ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AND
EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE
Klaas J. Kraay

I defend the first premise of William Rowe’s well-known arguments from evil
against influential criticisms due to William Alston. I next suggest that the
central inference in Rowe’s arguments is best understood to move from the
claim that we have an absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to the claim
that we have evidence of absence of such a theodicy. I endorse the view which
holds that this move succeeds only if it is reasonable to believe that (roughly)
if there were such a theodicy, we would probably know it. After conceding that there
may be modest prima facie support for this latter claim via the Principle of
Credulity, I consider and reject four more ambitious arguments in its favour.
I conclude that this necessary condition on Rowe’s crucial inference has not
been shown to be satisfied.

I. Types of Theodicies and Rowe’s Argument
A theodicy is an account of some good, g, for the sake of obtaining which
an omnipotent, omniscient being would be morally justified in permitting
some evil, e, to occur.1 Some theodicies, like the traditional soul-making
theodicy, are patient-centred: they maintain that e’s permission is justified
by some g which, primarily, is good for the suﬀerer. Others, like the traditional free will theodicy, are non-patient-centred: they maintain that e’s
permission is justified by some g which is not, primarily, good for the sufferer. Typically, theists and non-theists agree that no non-patient-centred
theodicy could be the whole of God’s reason for permitting some instance
of suﬀering.2
Many theodicies of both types involving known goods3 have been suggested and discussed by philosophers: these are proposed theodicies. But,
apart from these, it is at least conceivable there exist presently-unknown
theodicies of each type: these are unproposed theodicies.4 Such theodicies
might involve known goods, or they might involve goods not presently
known. More speculatively, perhaps, there might be unknowable theodicies, and these might involve known, unknown, or even unknowable goods.
(The table below illustrates these categories.)5 And, it is at least conceivable that somewhere within these categories there are philosophicallydefensible theodicies.6
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William Rowe’s famous evidential argument from evil begins with the following claim concerning two appalling instances of suﬀering, E1 and E2.7
(P)

No good state of aﬀairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that
being’s permitting E1 or E2.8

This claim holds that there are no adequate theodicies in categories (1), (2),
(3), (4), (7), and (10). From this premise, Rowe infers that, probably,
(Q)

No good state of aﬀairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient
being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitting E1 or E2.

This claim holds that there are no adequate theodicies in any of categories
(1)–(12). Rowe maintains that if we are justified in believing (Q) on the
basis of our belief that (P), “then, since we see that (Q) would be false if
[God] existed, we are justified in believing that [God] does not exist.”9 This
suggests that the argument should be completed as follows:
(R)

If an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being exists,
some good state of aﬀairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being in
permitting E1 or E2.10

Therefore, probably,
~ (G) No omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being exists.
The most controversial step in this argument is the inductive inference
from (P) to (Q). In a 1996 paper, Rowe attempts to bypass this by arguing
directly from (P) to ~(G).11 In what follows, when I refer to Rowe’s crucial
inferences, I have both of these moves in mind. Before discussing them
directly, however, I will first examine some notable criticisms of (P) due to
William Alston.
II. Alston’s Case Against (P)
Many theists agree that there are no adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 in
categories (1) and (2).12 But William Alston has claimed that even if this
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is so, nobody is justified in believing (P), since it is possible that there are
adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 somewhere in categories (3), (4), (7),
and (10).13 It is important to see that Alston’s case against (P) is not an appeal to the possibility of theodicies involving unknown goods: this would
be irrelevant to (P), which concerns only known goods.14 Rowe misses this
point when he says that “ . . . Alston concedes that he hasn’t shown that
we cannot be justified in believing that no good we know of justifies God
in permitting E1 and E2.”15 Alston concedes no such thing: his criticism of
(P) is very much concerned with known goods. Moreover, Alston does not
address whether we cannot be justified in believing that no known good
justifies God in permitting E1 and E2; he means only to argue that we
are not justified in believing this.16 He defends the latter claim by urging,
modestly, that it is a logical or epistemic possibility that there are adequate
theodicies for E1 and E2 somewhere in categories (3), (4), (7), and (10).
Alston further claims, more ambitiously, that it is a live possibility that there
are such theodicies. I will consider each strategy in turn.
Alston’s Modest Case Against (P)
Alston says that
we are not warranted in supposing that the possible reasons we
have been extracting from theodicies exhaust the possibilities for
patient-centred reasons God might have for permitting Bambi’s or
Sue’s suﬀering. Perhaps, unbeknownst to us, one or the other of
these bits of suﬀering is necessary, in ways we cannot grasp, for
some outweighing good of a sort with which we are familiar.17
This is a claim about unproposed, patient-centred theodicies involving
known goods, and Alston explicitly extends it to both non-patient-centred
theodicies and unknowable theodicies involving known goods. Alston’s
position, then, is that there may be adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 in categories (3), (4), (7), and (10). In 1996, he returns to this point. He first claims
that there are unexperienced known goods,18 and that, since we have only a
minimal grasp of such goods, for all we know they may be live candidates
for adequate theodicies relevant to E1 and E2. From this speculation, he
concludes that “we are in a bad position to determine whether the magnitude of the good is such as to make it worthwhile for God to permit a certain
evil in order to make its realization possible”19 Alston takes this to show that
we are not justified in believing (P).
Alston’s other argument for this conclusion refers to the conditions of
realization of known goods. Alston thinks it may be possible that certain evils
(such as E1 and E2) are necessary conditions for the realization of goods
with which we are familiar. If these goods are suﬃcient to justify God’s
permission of E1 and E2, then there are theodicies for E1 and E2 in categories (3), (4), (7), and (10). Alston makes the point rather modestly in the
following two passages:
I am not trying to show that there are conditions of realization that
are unknown to us. On the contrary. By mentioning such putative
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possibilities, I mean to indicate that we are not in a position to determine the extent to which there are such additional conditions and
what they are. Hence we are in no position to assert, with respect
to a given [known] good that is not disqualified by a low degree of
value, that a certain kind of suﬀering is not required for the realization of that good.
[O]ur grasp of the conditions of [some known good’s] realization may
not be suﬃcient for us to say with justified confidence that God could
have realized that good without permitting the evil in question and
without making too much of a sacrifice of good (or prevention of
evil) elsewhere in the [overall] scheme.20
Again, Alston takes these considerations to show that we are not justified
in believing (P).
Alston’s position seems to be this: since it is (1991, 1996) or may be (1996)
possible that there are theodicies relevant to E1 and E2 in categories (3),
(4), (7), and (10), we are not justified in believing (P). On one plausible
reading, then, Alston is committed to thinking that the logical possibility
(1991, 1996) or epistemic possibility (1996) that there are such theodicies is
suﬃcient to undercut our justification for believing (P). But this seems
extreme. Since Alston oﬀers no reason to think that this is a unique problem with respect to (P), it sounds as though he tacitly relies on general
principles such as these:
If it is logically possible that there is an x, we are not justified in
believing that there is no x.
If it is epistemically possible that there is an x, we are not justified
in believing that there is no x.21
But these principles are dubious: if the logical or epistemic possibility of
there being an x were automatically to defeat our justification for believing
that there is no x, then—implausibly—we would not be justified in asserting any negative existential claim (unless it concerned a state of aﬀairs
known to be impossible). I conclude that Alston’s modest case against (P)
is unsuccessful.22
Alston’s Ambitious Case Against (P)
While the mere logical or epistemic possibility of there being an x cannot
itself defeat the justification for believing that there is no x, the situation is
diﬀerent with live possibilities: it is generally thought that the live possibility of there being an x does (or at least could) undermine justification for
believing that there is no x. Alston oﬀers two arguments for the claim that
it is a live possibility that there are unproposed adequate theodicies involving known goods (theodicies in categories (3), (4), (7), and (10)):23 the
argument from progress, and the argument from omniscience.24 The former
appeals to the development of human knowledge throughout history:
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The pervasive phenomenon of human intellectual progress shows
that at any given time in the past there were many things not
known or even conceived that came to be conceived and known at
a later stage. The induction is obvious. It would be highly irrational
to suppose that we have reached the limit of this process and have
ascertained everything there is to be learned. This creates a presumption that with respect to values, as well as their conditions of
realization, there is much that lies beyond our present grasp.25
There may well be a pervasive phenomenon of human intellectual progress. And this phenomenon may indeed create (or, better, motivate) the
general fallibilist presumption that Alston has in mind. But Alston oﬀers
no reason for thinking that this general fallibilist presumption is itself sufficient to support his highly specific claim that it is a live possibility that
there are unproposed adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 involving known goods.
And it is diﬃcult to see how any such general presumption could itself
support such a particular claim.
That said, the following specific induction would be directly relevant: suppose that human beings had a long history of discovering that
previously-inscrutable evils were in fact conditions for the realization of
some known goods which proved to be at the heart of some adequate theodicy for those evils.26 This, I think, would motivate the specific presumption
required: it would show it to be a live possibility that there are unproposed
theodicies for E1 and E2 involving known goods. But, of course, no such
history is recorded, so this cannot help Alston’s case.27
Alston’s second argument (for the claim that it is a live possibility that
there are unproposed theodicies relevant to E1 and E2 involving known
goods) appeals to God’s omniscience:
our topic is not the possibilities for future human apprehensions [of
known goods28], but rather what an omniscient being can grasp of
modes of value and the conditions of their realization. Surely it is
eminently possible that there are real possibilities for the latter that exceed anything we can anticipate, or even conceptualize. It would be
exceedingly strange if an omniscient being did not immeasurably
exceed our grasp of such matters. Thus there is an unquestionably live
possibility that God’s reasons for allowing human suﬀering may have
to do, in part, with the appropriate connection of those suﬀerings
with [known] goods in ways that we have never dreamed in our
theodicies. Once we bring this into the picture, the critic is seen to
be on shaky ground in denying, of [E1 or E2], that God could have
any patient-centred reason for permitting it, even if we are unable to
suggest what such a reason might be.29
I am sympathetic to the spirit of Alston’s move here, but his argument is
unpersuasive. Certainly it is true that, if there were adequate unproposed
patient-centred theodicies involving known goods (theodicies in categories (3) and (7)), an omniscient God would know this. But Alston wants
to show that it is a live possibility that there are such theodicies, and the
only support oﬀered for this claim seems to be his suggestion that ‘it is
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eminently possible that there are real possibilities for’ what God can grasp
of value that we cannot. This sounds like a shift from mere logical (perhaps even epistemic) possibility to live possibility.30 Since neither logical
nor epistemic possibility entail live possibility, this move requires further
support to be convincing. I conclude that neither Alston’s modest nor his
ambitious case against (P) is successful.
From (P) to (P’)
I take it, then, that Alston has failed to show that critics of theism do not
justifiedly believe (P). But I agree with Alston’s claim that formulating the
evidential argument in terms of (P)
gives the false impression that the main problem is one of generalizing to all goods from known goods, whereas the main problem is
not that but rather the inference from “We cannot discern any way
in which God would be morally justified in permitting E1 or E2” to
“There is no such way.”31
(P) gives this misleading impression because it is a broad claim concerning
each of categories (1), (2), (3), (4), (7), and (10)—the categories concerned
with known goods—even though the only evidence for (P) is the generallyuncontested claim that there are no adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 in
categories (1) and (2).
We might say, then, that (P) suppresses an important inference from a
claim concerning categories (1) and (2) to a claim concerning categories
(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), and (10). I have been criticizing Alston’s eﬀorts to
undermine this inference, but, while I believe them to be unsuccessful,
this should not be construed as an endorsement of the inference. I believe
that it will remain controversial, and for this very reason, it should be
made explicit in the argument from evil. This is easily done by reformulating (P) so that it no longer suppresses the inference in question: I
propose to replace
(P) No good state of aﬀairs we know of is such that an omnipotent,
omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s
permitting E1 or E2.
with
(P’) We know of no good state of aﬀairs’ being such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that
being’s permitting E1 or E2.32
While (P) claims that there are no satisfactory theodicies in categories (1),
(2), (3), (4), (7), and (10), (P’) claims only that there are no satisfactory theodicies in categories (1) and (2).33 From this generally-uncontested ground,
then, defenders of Rowe’s earlier arguments can try to secure (Q), and
thereby ~(G) via (R), or, in the spirit of Rowe’s later argument, defenders
of Rowe can try to secure ~(G) directly. And, of course, critics of Rowe can
try to block both moves.
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III. Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence
The inference from (P’) to (Q) is, I believe, best understood to move from a
claim concerning the absence of evidence to a claim concerning the evidence
of absence: (P’) contends that we have no evidence of a satisfactory theodicy for E1 and E2, and this is thought to render probable the claim, (Q),
that there just are no such theodicies. (Put another way, the inference generalizes from a claim concerning theodical categories (1) and (2) to a claim
concerning all the theodical categories.) Similarly, Rowe’s later inference
from (P’) directly to ~(G) is best understood to move from the absence of
evidence of adequate theodicies directly to evidence of the absence (i.e.,
non-existence) of God.34 It is true, of course, that absence of evidence is
neither identical to, nor entails, evidence of absence.35 But Rowe’s inferences are obviously not meant to be deductive; and, if certain conditions
are satisfied, the absence of evidence can give strong inductive support to a
claim concerning the evidence of absence. In Section IV, I identify one such
necessary condition with respect to Rowe’s inferences, and in the remainder, I claim that this condition has not been shown to be satisfied.
IV. A Necessary Condition on Rowe’s Inferences
Rowe first defends the inference from (P) to (Q) with enumerative induction. He urges that
we are justified in making this inference in the same way we are
justified in making the many inferences we constantly make from
the known to the unknown. All of us are constantly inferring from
the A’s we know of to the A’s we don’t know of. If we observe many
A’s and all of them are B’s, we are justified in believing that the A’s
we haven’t observed are also B’s. If I encounter a fair number of pit
bulls and all of them are vicious, I have reason to believe that all pit
bulls are vicious.36
(With respect to (P’), this argument can be understood as an enumerative induction from the claim that we know of no adequate theodicies with
respect to E1 and E2 to the claim that there are no such theodicies.) In
response, Alston argues that the inference from (P) to (Q) is not a typical
case of enumerative induction.37 He holds that “[t]ypically, when we generalize from observed instances, at least when we are warranted in doing
so, we know quite a lot about what makes a sample of things like that a
good base for general attributions of the property in question,” and he
suggests that we have no such knowledge in the relevant case.38 In terms
of (P’), Alston’s position would be that we have no reason for thinking that
our failure to find adequate theodicies with respect to E1 or E2 is a good
basis for concluding that there are no such theodicies.
Rowe agrees that his initial defence of the inference from (P) to (Q) is
inadequate.39 He concedes that this argument can establish only that (P)
makes (Q) more probable than it would otherwise be, not that (P) renders
(Q) more probable than not.40 And Rowe notes that showing this latter claim
is essential for showing that one is justified in believing (Q) on the basis
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of (P). Rowe does oﬀer an argument for thinking that (P) makes (Q) more
probable than not, but his argument depends on the undefended claim
that Pr(P/G&k) = 0.5.41 Suppose, however, that Pr(P/G&k) is not just 0.5,
but very high. This, as many theists have argued, would surely undercut
the inference from (P) to (Q): it would show that one’s belief in (P) provides no strong support for belief in (Q).42 Accordingly, if Rowe’s inference
is to go through, Rowe needs to show that it is reasonable to believe that
Pr(P/G&k) is not high. I take it that the foregoing applies mutatis mutandis to
the inference from (P’) to (Q): if this inference is to go through, Rowe needs
to show that it is reasonable to believe that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. Since
Rowe oﬀers no such reason, his argument is insuﬃciently-supported.
As noted earlier, Rowe’s latest evidential argument attempts to bypass
the troublesome inference from (P) to (Q): using Bayes’ Theorem, Rowe
argues directly from (P) to ~(G).43 This move, then, is not from the absence
of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to evidence of the absence of one,
but is instead a move from the absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy directly to the claim that God does not exist. Rowe concedes, however,
that if Pr(P/G&k) were high, then (P) would not significantly lower the
probability of (G). Rowe replies to Wykstra’s argument for the claim that
Pr(P/G&k) is high,44 but, as Bergmann correctly notes, this cannot show
that Rowe’s argument succeeds: Rowe still bears the burden of showing
that Pr(P/G&k) is not high:
The problem with Rowe’s [1996] argument is that he doesn’t clearly
address the concern that P fails to provide significant support for ~G.
He seems to think that, in response to this worry, he needs to show
only that we have no good reason to think Pr(P/G&k) is high (this is
what he argues for in response to Wykstra). But that isn’t true. What
he needs to show is that we have good reason to think Pr(P/G&k) is
not high. Otherwise, he hasn’t shown us that P significantly lowers
the probability of G.45
In his recent reply to Bergmann, Rowe explicitly accepts this burden of
proof: he agrees that the success of his new argument depends on there
being good reason to think that Pr(P/G&k) is not high.46 And again, I take
it that the foregoing applies mutatis mutandis to the inference from (P’)
to ~(G): this inference can succeed only if it is reasonable to believe that
Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.47
V. Pr(P’/G&k) and Skeptical Defences of Theism
In order for Rowe’s arguments to persuade, then, we need some reason to
believe that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. In what follows, I argue that while this
probability claim may be thought to enjoy limited prima facie plausibility,
four more ambitious arguments in its defence fail. In recent years, the term
skeptical theist has been applied to some of those who resist inferences like
Rowe’s. But this term overdetermines the position, since one could of course
resist these inferences without being a theist. For this reason, HowardSnyder prefers the expression skeptical gambit for the strategy, and (I presume)
skeptical gambiteer for one who employs it. By itself, however, this locution
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underdetermines the context, and so I propose to use the expression skeptical
defender of theism (SDT) to refer to those who resist inferences like Rowe’s.
But some further distinctions are needed, since there are various ways
of so resisting. Let us say that a negative SDT claims that certain arguments
for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high fail. This position, of course, is
consistent with agnosticism concerning Pr(P’/G&k).48 A positive SDT, in
contrast, claims that it is not the case that Pr(P’/G&k) is low. A modest positive SDT claims only this, but an ambitious positive SDT goes further by
claiming that Pr(P’/G&k) is high.49 As will be evident, I position myself
only as a negative skeptical defender of theism in what follows.
VI. Arguments for the Claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is Not High
So, those who endorse Rowe’s argument need to provide reason for thinking that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, and there are various ways in which critics
might respond. How might one show that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high? One
modest approach is to claim that this judgement enjoys prima facie plausibility. As Richard Swinburne notes, “[a] supreme principle which covers
the justification of belief . . . is surely the principle which has been called the
Principle of Credulity—that, other things being equal, it is probable and so
rational to believe that things are as they [epistemically] seem to be (and the
stronger the inclination, the more rational the belief).”50 One might argue
that the Principle of Credulity is relevant in this context: it just (epistemically) seems to us, some might say, that on G&k, it is not likely that we would
know of no good state of aﬀairs’ being such that an omnipotent, omniscient
being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitting E1 or E2.
Thus, via the Principle of Credulity, we are entitled to believe that, ceteris
paribus, it is the case that on G&k, it is not likely that we would know of
no good state of aﬀairs’ being such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s
obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitting E1 or E2.
Those who want to resist the argument at this point may avail themselves of either an ambitious or a modest response. The former flatly
denies that the Principle of Credulity is appropriately deployed in this
domain. A modal skeptic, for instance, might hold the general view that
none of our intuitions about complex counterfactuals should even be
deemed prima facie plausible.51 The latter, more modest response concedes
that the Principle of Credulity indeed yields prima facie reason to believe
that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, but claims that this amounts to very little.52
For instance, one might argue that this prima facie plausibility is undercut
or rebutted by the presence of some defeaters for this belief. 53 I note these
moves only en passant: space does not permit their examination. Instead,
since I suspect that defenders of Rowe would prefer stronger support
(than that which may be conferred by the Principle of Credulity) for the
claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, I now turn to four more ambitious arguments in defence of this claim. I show that they fail.
Epistemic Access to Known Goods and the Unlikelihood of Unknown Goods
Michael Tooley oﬀers an argument that can plausibly be construed to
conclude that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.54 This argument may be expressed
as follows:
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(1) If some known property is good-making, then, probably, it appears
so to us.
(2) It is probable that there are no unknown good-making properties.55
Therefore, probably,
(3) Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.
In defence of premise (2), Tooley argues that the history of intellectual inquiry in the last few thousand years “does not consist in the recognition
of more good-making and bad-making properties, or right-making and
wrong-making properties. It consists, rather, in a gradually increasing
ability on the part of humans to respond appropriately to those properties wherever they occur” (115). We have, Tooley thinks, discovered all
the good-making properties we are likely to discover. This argument
has been criticized. Daniel Howard-Snyder oﬀers a hypothetical ‘punctuated equilibrium’ account of moral progress, on which our failure to
discover new good-making properties in the last few thousand years is
entirely unsurprising. Since we cannot rule out this account, HowardSnyder urges, our confidence in (2) should be undermined.56 More tellingly, Bergmann notes that the conclusion that we have discovered all
the good-making properties we are likely to discover simply does not
warrant (2).57
What about Tooley’s first premise? In order to motivate this claim,
Tooley distinguishes knowledge of morality from knowledge in other
areas of human inquiry:
In many areas, truth may well remain forever hidden from our gaze.
In mathematics, one may contemplate a proposition, without even
suspecting that it is a theorem, let alone discovering a proof of it.
In physics, we may never arrive at a totally satisfactory theory of
the physical world, with the result that we may be totally unable to
describe the causes of events that are perfectly familiar to us. Can
morality be just like that? Could there, for example, be some property with which we were all perfectly familiar, which was of great
moral significance, but which never struck any human, at any time,
as having any moral importance at all? Or could there be a property
of states of aﬀairs that was good-making, but which seemed to all
humans, at all times, to be a bad-making property? Could there be a
property of actions that was wrong-making, but which all humans
firmly believed was right-making?58
Clearly, Tooley thinks that these questions should be answered negatively,
but he oﬀers no explicit argument for this doctrine of epistemic accessibility. He does explain, however, why he holds this view:
The main ground of this feeling, I think, lies in the idea, first, that a
property cannot be morally significant in itself unless the belief that
something has that property, or the belief that some possible state of
aﬀairs or action would have that property, has the power to aﬀect
one’s motivation in certain ways, and secondly, that the belief that a
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property is morally significant in itself arises out of an awareness of
the intrinsically-motivating quality of the relevant beliefs.59
These considerations strike me as incomplete at best.60 The first claim
seems to state a necessary condition on some property’s being morally
significant: a property is morally significant only if the belief that some
state of aﬀairs has (or might have) that property has the power to aﬀect
one’s motivation. But—even if such a connection exists—this has nothing to do with epistemic transparency: no connection is here suggested
between a property’s moral significance and one’s awareness of that significance. Tooley’s second consideration posits some (presumably causal)
connection between the belief that a property is morally-significant and
the awareness of the motivating powers of beliefs concerning that property.
But even if such a connection exists, this just does not show that we would
likely be aware that our beliefs have the power to motivate.
Further, even if Tooley’s premises were both well-supported and true,
they would still provide only weak support for his conclusion. Recall the
formulation of (P’):
(P’) We know of no good state of aﬀairs’ being such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that
being’s permitting E1 or E2.
Tooley’s premises do not show that the probability of (P’) on (G) and k is
low, because, even if we have significant epistemic access to all goods, and
even if it is unlikely that there are any unknown goods, we might still be
unaware of myriad ways in which these known goods might feature in
unproposed theodicies.
Patient-Centred Restrictions on the Permission of Suﬀering.
Proponents of the evidential argument from evil sometimes stress the idea
that certain known moral principles govern the permission of evil. Rowe,
for instance, suggests that
we normally would not regard someone as morally justified in permitting intense, involuntary suﬀering on the part of another, if that
other were not to figure significantly in the good for which that
suﬀering was necessary.61
In a similar vein, Tooley suggests that
it is morally permissible for an omnipotent and omniscient being to
allow a morally innocent individual to suﬀer only if that suﬀering
will benefit the individual in question, or, at least, if it is suﬃcientlylikely that it will do so.62
Let us call this the patient-centred restriction on the permission of suﬀering.63
Tooley thinks that this restriction can be used to show that it is unlikely
that a given instance of suﬀering is morally justified, even if the theist
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appeals to the possibility that the reason for the sake of which the evil is
permitted is beyond our ken:
suppose that the [appeal to theodicies beyond our ken64] rests upon
the idea that, if God exists, humans will have very limited knowledge of certain non-moral facts—specifically, those concerning
certain states of aﬀairs that play an essential role in God’s grand
plan for the world. Can this be the basis of a serious objection to
the argument from evil? Suppose that certain intrinsically undesirable states of aﬀairs are such that we cannot immediately detect
the existence of any appropriately-related goods that would justify the evils in question. We apply our knowledge of the relevant
moral principles to the situation, and conclude that there could
be a good that would justify an omnipotent and omniscient being only if some condition C is satisfied. Perhaps we conclude, for
example, that the evil in question can only be justified if humans
survive death, or if they have libertarian free will. Making use of
the non-moral information we have, we then determine that while
it is possible that C is true, it is very unlikely that this is the case.
We therefore conclude that it is very unlikely that there is a morally
suﬃcient reason for the evil in question.65
Tooley’s idea, then, is that if the reasons why God permits evils are beyond
our ken, we should nevertheless expect a patient-centred condition C to
be satisfied.66 Since it’s unlikely that such a condition is satisfied, Tooley
concludes, it’s not reasonable to suppose that evils are permitted for the
sake of reasons beyond our ken. While Tooley does not explicitly use these
considerations to urge that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, I believe that his remarks suggest just such an argument:67
AT: There are adequate theodicies relevant to E1 and E2 beyond our
ken.
PCS: Patient-centred condition C is satisfied.68
(1) If (G & AT), then PCS.
(2) We know of no state of aﬀairs’ being such that, in virtue of it,
PCS.
Therefore, probably,
(3) ~PCS
Therefore, probably,
(4) ~(G & AT)
Therefore, probably ,
(5) If G, then ~AT
This argument can be understood to support the claim that Pr(P’/G&k)
is not high, so if it is a good argument, the necessary condition on the
success of Rowe’s crucial inferences is satisfied. But note that this argument depends on the very sort of inference currently under dispute: the
inference from (2) to (3). Why suppose, for instance, that our absence of
evidence concerning some patient’s post-mortem recompense for suﬀering justifies belief in the absence of such recompense? In order to defend
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the inference from (2) to (3), an argument is needed for the claim that
Pr((2)/G&k) is not high. It is diﬃcult to imagine how such an argument
could succeed, since this would involve showing not only that, probably,
no known condition C is satisfied, and, in addition, that either there are
no unknown conditions C, or that there are such conditions, but they are
probably not satisfied. I conclude that—at minimum—this argument from
patient-centred restrictions fails, since it objectionably relies on the very
sort of inference it purports to defend.
Divine Silence
Michael Bergmann notices that Rowe oﬀers an argument which might be
understood to support the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. Bergmann
finds this argument in the following passage from Rowe:69
When God permits horrendous suﬀering for the sake of some good,
if that good is beyond our ken, God will make every eﬀort to be consciously present to us during our period of suﬀering, will do his best
to explain to us why he is permitting us to suﬀer, and will give us
special assurances of his love and concern during the period of suﬀering. Since enormous numbers of human beings undergo prolonged,
horrendous suﬀering without being consciously aware of any such
divine presence, concern, and explanations, we may conclude that
if there is a God, the goods for the sake of which he permits horrendous human suﬀering are more often than not goods we know of.70
As Bergmann points out, Rowe appears to assume here that divine silence
in the face of human suﬀering could not be justified. This move should not
be suppressed. One might make it explicit, and at the same time include it
an argument for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. This can be done in
the following fashion, in the spirit of Rowe’s remarks:
S:

There is divine silence.71

SJ: There is some good that justifies God in permitting divine silence.
AT: There are adequate theodicies relevant to E1 and E2 beyond our
ken.72
(1) If (G & AT) then (~S ∨ SJ )
(2) We know of no good state of aﬀairs’ being such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that
being’s permission of divine silence.
Therefore, probably,
(3) ~SJ
(4) S
Therefore, probably,
(5) S & ~SJ
Therefore, probably,
(6) ~(~S ∨ SJ )
Therefore, probably,
(7) ~(G & AT)
Therefore, probably,
(8) If G, then ~AT
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This argument can be understood to support the claim that Pr(P’/G&k)
is not high, so, again, if it is a good argument, the necessary condition on
the success of Rowe’s crucial inferences is satisfied. But Bergmann rightly
points out that this argument depends on the inference from (2) to (3),
which is precisely the sort of inference under dispute.73 Rowe concedes as
much in his reply to Bergmann.74 As displayed, then, this argument fails to
provide independent support for thinking that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.
One way to avoid this problem is to establish (3) without using (2) as a
premise. In his recent reply to Bergmann, this is just what Rowe attempts
to do.75 Surprisingly, however, Rowe does not argue for SJ using diﬀerent
premises: instead, he urges that SJ is inherently implausible: “My reply is
that [SJ] is an inherently implausible idea, not dependent for its implausibility on a prior rejection of one or more skeptical theses.”76 So Rowe, in eﬀect,
asserts (3) without arguing for it. In my view, this move is unacceptable.
For one thing, it is a conversation-stopper, because if the theist fails to just
see this (alleged) inherent implausibility, no arguments can be oﬀered to
help her see it.77 Worse, if this “inherent implausibility move” is deemed
acceptable in this controversial context, it might just as well be deployed
earlier in the philosophical conversation about evil: it might be suggested
that it is inherently implausible that an adequate theodicy exists for some
horrific instance of evil. Or, for that matter, this move might be used at the
outset of the discussion: it might be suggested that the very idea that God
exists is inherently implausible. Such ‘short-circuiting’ moves are unlikely
to impress the theist, nor should they. I conclude, then, that Rowe’s latest
attempt to defend the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high fails.
Ordinary Moral Reasoning
Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy recognize that the crucial step in the
evidential argument from evil requires that it be reasonable to believe that
Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.78 But they also claim that those skeptical of this
probability-claim commit themselves to a reprehensible skepticism concerning ordinary moral reasoning.79 Although not explicitly deployed in
this manner, the argument may be taken as intending to oﬀer indirect support for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. Almeida and Oppy reason
as follows:
Our central claim is that, if the considerations to which ‘sceptical
theists’ appeal—considerations of human cognitive limitations in the
realm of values (and perhaps elsewhere as well)—were alone sufficient to undermine the noseeum inference in evidential arguments
from evil, then those considerations would also be alone suﬃcient
to undermine familiar and ordinary kinds of moral reasoning. If the
kinds of considerations to which sceptical theists appeal entail that
we can assign no probability to the claim that there are great goods
that are secured by the failure of a perfect being to prevent [E1 or
E2], then the kinds of considerations to which sceptical theists appeal also entail that we can assign no probability to the claim that
there are great goods that are secured by our failure to prevent [E1
or E2]. But if we assign no probability to the claim that there are great
goods that are secured by our failure to prevent [E1 or E2], then we
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cannot arrive at a reasoned view about whether or not to intervene
to prevent [E1 or E2]. And that’s not an acceptable result.80
Almeida and Oppy illustrate their position by recasting their evidential
argument from evil as an argument in favour of a human being’s intervening to prevent some instance of evil, and then claiming that skepticism
concerning such an inference is unreasonable.81 Their move may similarly
be applied to my reconstruction of Rowe’s argument:
(P*) I know of no good state of aﬀairs’ being such that my obtaining
it would morally justify me in permitting E1 or E2.
(Q*) No good state of aﬀairs is such that my obtaining it would morally justify me in permitting E1 or E2.
So, Almeida and Oppy are committed to the view that anyone skeptical of the move from (P’) to (Q) should also be skeptical of the inference
from (P*) to (Q*). And they see this as a fatal problem for the skeptical
defender of theism, since they maintain that moral reasoning requires
us regularly and confidently to make inferences of just this form: “Our
moral practice—our ordinary moral reasoning—shows that we do think
it unlikely that there are goods beyond our ken which would justify us
in not preventing [E1 or E2].”82 If we are unwilling inductively to infer
(Q*) from (P*), then “there is a massive impediment to our reasoning to
the conclusion that we ought to try to prevent [E1 or E2].”83 (This is why I
treat their argument as an indirect argument for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k)
is not high.)
Several replies to this line of argument may be imagined. First, it might
be argued that, contra Almeida and Oppy, skepticism about the move
from (P’) to (Q) need not lead to skepticism concerning the inference
from (P*) to (Q*).84 But even if it does lead to such skepticism, one might
plausibly claim that this is not problematic for the skeptical defender of
theism, since our ordinary moral reasoning simply does not require inductive inferences like (P*)–(Q*). This can be shown in two ways. An ambitious argument would show that inferences like (P*)–(Q*) simply are
not persuasive, from which it follows that our ordinary moral reasoning
(presumed here to be generally-successful) does not require them.85 But
a modest argument will suﬃce.86 Almeida and Oppy repeatedly suggest
that inferences like (P*)–(Q*) are necessary conditions for the relevant sort
of moral reasoning, but this can be denied. Specifically, this can be denied
by oﬀering a model of the relevant sort of moral reasoning that does not
require the (P*)–(Q*) inference. Here is one such model:87
(P*)
(S)
(T)

I know of no good state of aﬀairs’ being such that my obtaining it
would morally justify me in permitting E1 or E2.
I have no good reason to believe that there is a good state of affairs such that my obtaining it would morally justify me in permitting E1 or E2.88
I have fulfilled my relevant epistemic and moral duties in considering whether there might be a good state of aﬀairs such that my
obtaining it would morally justify me in permitting E1 or E2.
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(U)

If (P*), (S), and (T), I am entitled to believe that I am not justified
in permitting E1 or E2.
Therefore,
(V) I am entitled to believe that I am not justified in permitting E1 or
E2.
It seems to me that (V) secures the sort of moral reasoning that concerns
Almeida and Oppy, and that this argument is plausible. If so (or if some
other argument for the conclusion is plausible), then Almeida and Oppy
are mistaken when they claim that our ordinary moral reasoning requires
inferences like (P*)–(Q*). And if our ordinary moral reasoning does not require such inferences, this indirect argument for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k)
is not high fails.89
VII. Conclusion
Rowe’s important evidential arguments from evil depend, respectively, on
the inferences from (P) to (Q), and from (P) directly to ~(G). I have argued
that William Alston’s criticisms of (P) fail, but that (P) should nevertheless
be replaced with (P’), to better capture the spirit of Rowe’s inferences. The
inference from (P’) to (Q), I have claimed, is a move from the absence of
evidence of a satisfactory theodicy in categories (1) and (2) to the claim
that no such theodicy exists in any of the twelve categories. Rowe’s later
inference from (P’) directly to ~(G), I have suggested, is best understood
to be a move from the absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy in
categories (1) and (2) to the claim that God is absent (i.e., does not exist). Inferences from absence of evidence to evidence of absence can be
persuasive, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. In this case, if
Rowe’s inferences are to persuade, it must be reasonable to believe that
Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. Rowe, as noted, concedes as much.
One might think that, given the Principle of Credulity, it is reasonable to
suppose that this probability claim is prima facie plausible. (I mentioned, en
passant, two ways in which the critic of Rowe’s argument might respond.)
But surely the defender of Rowe’s argument would prefer stronger support for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. I have considered and rejected four more ambitious arguments in defence of this claim, thereby
oﬀering what I call a negative skeptical defence of theism. I take it, then, that
a necessary condition on the success of Rowe’s central inferences has not
been shown to be satisfied. If I am right to reject these four arguments,
the defender of Rowe’s inferences has at least three possible avenues of
response: she can (1) reject the claim that it must be reasonable to believe
that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high for Rowe’s inferences to succeed; (2) concede
that it must be reasonable to believe that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, but argue
that prima facie support for this claim via the Principle of Credulity is suﬃcient; or (3) oﬀer new arguments for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.
I doubt, however, that any of these strategies is promising.90
Ryerson University
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NOTES
1. For simplicity, I will stipulate that such a good may also be the prevention of an evil e2 such that, had e2 occurred, the world would have been worse
oﬀ (ceteris paribus) than it is given the occurrence of e.
2. More on this in Section VI, below.
3. I use this term in Rowe’s wide sense:
What counts as a “good we know of”? I do not mean to limit us to goods
that we know to have occurred. Nor do I mean to limit us to those goods
and goods that we know will occur in the future. I mean to include goods
that we have some grasp of, even though we have no knowledge at all
that they have occurred or ever will occur. (“The Evidential Argument
from Evil: A Second Look,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. D.
Howard-Snyder [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996], p. 264)
4. Many responses to the problem of evil turn on the possibility of there
being philosophically-defensible—but yet unproposed—theodicies.
5. This way of categorizing theodicies is suggested by remarks in William
Alston, “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,” in Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, ed. J. E. Tomberlin
(Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991), pp. 29–67. (Subsequent page
references to this article will refer to the 1996 reprint in Daniel HowardSnyder’s The Evidential Argument from Evil [Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1996], pp. 97–125.) I thank Steve Wykstra for suggesting the terms ‘proposed’ and ‘unproposed’ in place of ‘known’ and ‘unknown’.
6. I make no claim concerning whether these categories (actually or possibly) contain philosophically-defensible theodicies.
7. This argument is discussed in “Evil and Theodicy,” Philosophical Topics
16 (1988), pp. 119–132; “Ruminations about Evil,” Philosophical Perspectives 5:
Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 69–88; and “William Alston on the Problem of
Evil,” in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faiths, ed. T. Senor, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 71–93.
E1 is the hypothetical example of a fawn, trapped in a forest fire and horribly burned, who suﬀers for days before dying. This example was introduced to
the literature by Rowe in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,”
American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 335–41. E2 is an actual case of a
of a five-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan, who was beaten, raped, and strangled
to death by her mother’s boyfriend on New Year’s Day, 1986. This example was
introduced into the literature by Bruce Russell, in “The Persistent Problem of
Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989), pp. 121–39.
8. In papers published in 1996 and 1998, (P) claims that there is no known
good that justifies God in permitting E1 and E2 (“A Second Look,” and “Reply
to Plantinga,” Nous 34 [1998], pp. 545–52.) But Rowe takes pains to render this
conjunctive formulation consistent with his earlier disjunctive version of (P) by
allowing conjuctive goods:
Since we are talking about a good that justifies God in permitting E1
and E2, we should allow, if not expect, that the good in question would
be a conjunctive good. Perhaps there is a good we know of that justifies
God in permitting E1. Perhaps there is a good we know of that justifies
God in permitting E2. If so, then we will allow that it is true that some
good we know of (a conjunction of the goods in question) justifies God
in permitting E1 and E2. It should be obvious that I am trying to pose a
serious diﬃculty for the theist by picking a diﬃcult case of natural evil,
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E1 (Bambi), and a diﬃcult case of moral evil, E2 (Sue). Should no good
we know of justify God in permitting either of these two evils, P is true.
(“A Second Look,” p. 264)
9. “Evil and Theodicy,” p. 126.
10. Rowe never explicitly defends anything like (R); he seems to take it
for granted as a necessary truth. (See “A Second Look,” p. 284, note 22.) Many
theists agree with (R)’s claim that the existence of God is inconsistent with the
existence of any gratuitous evil, but there are noteworthy dissenters, such as
John Hick (Evil and the God of Love, 2nd Edition [London: MacMillan Press,
1973], pp. 333–36); Michael Peterson (Evil and the Christian God [Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1982], pp. 79–120); Peter van Inwagen (“The Problem of
Air, the Problem of Evil, the Problem of Silence,” in The Evidential Argument
from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1996], pp. 151–74); Keith Yandell (“Gratuitous Evil and Divine Existence,” Religious Studies 25 [1989], pp. 15–30); and William Hasker (“The Necessity of
Gratuitous Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 9 [1992], pp. 23–44.)
11. “A Second Look,” p. 270.
12. Richard Swinburne is an exception. See his Providence and the Problem of
Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
13. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” pp. 108–109; and “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil,” in The Evidential
Argument from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1996], pp. 324–25. On Alston’s view, categories (4) and (10) can at best
provide partial reasons, since he thinks that no non-patient-centred good can
provide the whole of God’s reason for the permission of E1 and E2 (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 111). A complete, adequate theodicy might
be conjunctive, however, by employing elements from both the patient-centred
and non-patient-centred columns.
14. Alston does appeal to the possibility of unknown goods, but this is
relevant only to his eﬀorts to undermine the inference from (P) to (Q): it is no
part of his case against (P) itself. (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,” pp.
108–109, 119; “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts,” p. 325).
15. “A Second Look,” p. 281. See note 8 for Rowe’s treatment of conjunctive
goods.
16. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 110; “Some (Temporarily) Final
Thoughts,” p. 325).
17. Ibid., p. 108–109 (emphasis added).
18. Such as, for Alston, the good of writing great poetry or the great good of
experiencing complete felicity in the everlasting presence of God (“Some [Temporarily]
Final Thoughts,” p. 324). For Rowe’s definition of a ‘known’ good, see note 3.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., pp. 324, 325, respectively. (Emphasis added.)
21. There are, of course, many senses of ‘epistemically possible’. Here are
three (with thanks to Mike Bergmann for helping to clarify matters here):
(a) P is epistemically possible iﬀ we don’t know that ~P. (For all we
know, P.)
(b) P is epistemically possible iﬀ we don’t justifiedly believe ~P. (For all
we justifiedly believe, P.)
(c) P is epistemically possible iﬀ for all we know or justifiedly believe,
P.
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On the first—stronger—reading, the second principle I attribute to
Alston seems straightforwardly implausible, since it seems to imply that
knowledge and justification covary in this context:
If we don’t know that there is no x, we are not justified in believing that there is no x.
On the second—weaker—reading, the principle becomes trivial:
If we don’t justifiedly believe that there is no x, then we are not
justified in believing that there is no x.
Hence, on the third reading, the principle is either implausible or trivial.
22. Others have argued that positions like Alston’s lead to some form of
inappropriate skepticism (Richard Gale, “Some Diﬃculties in Theistic Treatments of Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder,
[Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996], pp. 208–209; Bruce Russell,
“Defenseless,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996], pp. 196–98; and David O’Connor,
God and Inscrutable Evil, [Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998], pp. 220–21)
and these charges have not gone unanswered (see Michael Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” Nous 35 [2001],
pp. 289–93; Alston “Some [Temporarily] Final Thoughts,” pp. 321–22; and Daniel Howard-Snyder, “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” in The Evidential
Argument from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1996], pp. 292–93). But this discussion typically concerns Alston-style
worries about the inference from (P) to (Q), not Alston’s case against (P) itself.
While it may be that the latter argument “does not rely on a general skepticism
about our cognitive powers, about our capacity to achieve knowledge and justified belief” (Alston, “The Inductive Argument From Evil,” p. 121), his modest
case does appear to rely on the implausible principles noted.
23. While I am at present only interested in Alston’s case against (P), I
should note that Alston takes the arguments from progress and omniscience
to be relevant both to the rejection of (P) and to his eﬀorts to block the inference
from (P) to (Q). On the page immediately following these arguments in his
1991 paper, he says:
I have been arguing, and will continue to argue, that Rowe is not justified
in asserting P, since he is not justified in supposing that none of the particular goods we have been discussing provide God with suﬃcient reason
for permitting the suﬀering of Bambi and Sue. But even if Rowe were justified in asserting P, what I have just been contending is that the inference
from P to Q does not go through. (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,”
p. 110, and see also “Some [Temporarily] Final Thoughts,” p. 325)
24. Daniel Howard-Snyder deploys similar arguments in his eﬀort to block
the (P)–(Q) inference (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” p. 301).
25. “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts,” p. 320. In his earlier paper,
Alston puts the argument like this:
our cognitions of the world, obtained by filtering raw data through
such conceptual screens as we have available for the nonce, acquaint us
with only some indeterminable fraction of what there is to be known.
The progress of human knowledge makes this evident. No one explicitly realized the distinction between concrete and abstract entities, the
distinction between eﬃcient and final causes, the distinction between
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knowledge and opinion, until the great creative thinkers adumbrated
these distinctions and disseminated them to their fellows. The development of physical science has made us aware of a myriad of things
hitherto undreamed of, and developed the concepts with which to grasp
them—gravitation, electricity, electromagnetic fields, space-time curvature, irrational numbers, and so on. It is an irresistable induction from
this that we have not reached the final term of this process, and that
more realities, aspects, properties, structures remain to be discerned and
conceptualized. And why should values, and the conditions of their realization, be any exception to this generalization? A history of the apprehension of values could undoubtedly be written, parallel to the history
just adumbrated, though the archeology would be a more diﬃcult and
delicate task. (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 109)
This argument has been alleged to rely on a tendentious analogy between
knowledge of science and knowledge of values (Rowe, “William Alston on the
Problem of Evil,” p. 92 and Gale, “Some Diﬃculties,” pp. 209–10), and Alston
has replied (“Some [Temporarily] Final Thoughts,” p. 320).
26. Swinburne considers this thought experiment in a diﬀerent context
(Providence and The Problem of Evil, pp. 28–29).
27. There may be, I suppose, a via media between Alston’s (plausible, but
too general) fallibilist presumption motivated by the development of all human knowledge and the (suﬃciently-specific, but implausible) fallibilist presumption motivated by the imagined development of human knowledge concerning evils permitted for the sake of known goods. I suspect that any attempt
to take this route will appear ad hoc and perhaps question-begging, but this
remains to be seen: the burden of proof here is borne by defenders of Alston
on this point.
28. Alston means this argument to apply to both known and unknown
goods, but only the former is relevant to his criticism of (P).
29. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 109 (emphasis added).
30. In “William Alston on the Problem of Evil,” Rowe diagnoses several
similar shifts elsewhere in Alston’s 1991 argument.
31. “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts,” p. 322. See also pp. 315–16.
32. Michael Bergmann refers en passant to some worries concerning the
formulation of (P), and suggests the following replacement:
(P*) No good we know of is known by us to justify an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting E1 and E2 (“Skeptical
Theism,” p. 294, note 9).
I take this to be oﬀered in the same spirit at my (P’).
33. In personal correspondence, Rowe cautions me that (P’) may leave
some readers with the impression that for all we know, there is no known good
that we all know does not justify God in permitting E1 or E2. Rowe rightly
urges that this impression would be misleading and objectionable, since we
surely know of some known goods (such as Rowe’s enjoyment in smelling a
fine cigar) that they do not justify God’s permission of E1 or E2. I agree that
we know such things, and I am eager to avoid giving any impression to the
contrary, but (P’) entails no such position, nor—in my view—should it leave
anyone with this impression.
34. Wykstra vividly calls the former a noseeum inference (“Rowe’s
Noseeum Arguments from Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed.
D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996], p. 126);
Howard-Snyder characterises it as an inference from inscrutable evil to pointless evil (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” p. 291); and James Sennett
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thinks of it as an inference from inscrutable evil to unjustified evil (“The Inscrutable Evil Defense Against the Inductive Argument from Evil,” Faith and
Philosophy 10 [1993], pp. 220–29). One advantage of my slogan is that it applies equally to Rowe’s later argument.
35. This logical gap has been cited in arguments for modal conclusions: for
example, the late Boston University astronomer Michael Papagiannis famously defended the possibility of UFOs and alien abductions on such grounds (C.
D. B. Bryan, Close Encounters of the Fourth Kind: Alien Abduction, UFOs, and the
Conference at M.I.T., [New York: Knopf, 1995], p. 230). More soberingly, appeal to this logical gap also seems to have underwritten much of the case for
the recent war in Iraq: absence of evidence of weapons of mass destruction,
we were told, did not constitute evidence of their absence. For representative
remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, see www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/08/08/iraq/main567410.shtml.
36. “Evil and Theodicy,” pp. 123–24.
37. Sennett also criticises this argument, in “The Inscrutable Evil Defense.”
38. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 110.
39. “William Alston on the Problem of Evil,” pp. 90–91, and “A Second
Look,” p. 267.
40. Ibid., and “A Second Look,” p. 284, note 16.
41. “A Second Look,” p. 269. Constant k, of course, represents shared background knowledge. Rowe explains what is included in k as follows:
I take it as important here that k be restricted almost entirely to information that is shared by most theists and nontheists who have given some
thought to the issues raised by the problem of evil. To this end, we will
want to include in k our common knowledge of the occurrence of various evils in our world, including E1 and E2, as well as our knowledge
that the world contains a good deal of evil. k will also include our common understanding of the way the world works, the sorts of things we
know to exist in the world, along with our knowledge of many of the
goods that occur and many of the goods that do not occur. Of course, k
will not include the information that God exists or the information that
God does not exist. (“A Second Look,” p. 265)
42. See, for example, Alston (“The Inductive Argument from Evil”; “Some
[Temporarily] Final Thoughts”); Sennett (“The Inscrutable Evil Defense”);
Howard-Snyder (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil”); and Wykstra
(“Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil”).
43. “A Second Look,” pp. 266–70.
44. Wykstra’s argument is found in “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from
Evil.”
45. “Skeptical Theism,” p. 281.
46. “Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann,” Nous 35 (2001): p. 298
and p. 303, note 6. Almeida and Oppy explicitly accept a similar burden of
proof in their formulation of the evidential argument from evil, in “Sceptical
Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
81 (2003): p. 504.
47. In correspondence, Bruce Russell has suggested that he is now inclined
to deny that this is a necessary condition: he claims that certain arguments
from his “Defenseless” may be deployed in support of the view that it is not
necessary to believe that that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high in order for Rowe’s inferences to be persuasive. I will not consider this interesting objection here.
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48. Alston may be such an agnostic, and Howard-Snyder is too (see “The
Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” p. 304).
49. Judging by Wykstra’s claims in “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments” (pp.
136–37), he now is a modest positive SDT, but he used to be an ambitious positive SDT (in “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suﬀering:
On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance,’” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 17 [1984], pp. 73–94). Sennett appears to be an ambitious positive SDT
(“The Inscrutable Evil Defense,” p. 223). And Bergmann is a negative SDT (in
“Skeptical Theism”).
50. Providence and the Problem of Evil, p. 20. Swinburne applies this principle to the problem of evil by suggesting that it licences the inference from
“Evil E appears to be gratuitous” to “Evil E is gratuitous,” unless there is either
(a) strong positive evidence for the existence of God; or (b) a record of discovering with respect to many apparently-gratuitous evils that a theodicy works
with respect to them; or (c) a theodicy for each apparently-gratuitous evil (p.
29). He defends (c) in the remainder of Providence and the Problem of Evil.
51. I take it that this might be Peter van Inwagen’s position, given the following claims (made in his related discussion of the problem of evil):
our modal intuitions, while they are no doubt to be trusted when they
tell us that the table could have been placed on the other side of the room,
are not to be trusted on such matters as whether there could be transparent iron or whether there could be a “regular” universe in which there
were higher sentient creatures that did not suﬀer. And if this is true, it is
not surprising. Assuming that there are “modal facts of the matter,” why
should we assume that God or evolution or social training has given us
access to modal facts knowledge of which is of no interest to anyone but
the metaphysician? God or evolution has provided us with a capacity
for making judgments about size and distance which is very useful in
hunting mammoths and driving cars, but which is no use at all in astronomy. It seems that an analogous restriction applies to our capacity
for making modal judgments. (“The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air,
the Problem of Silence,” p. 162)
52. Alternatively, one might hold that, on reflection, the apparent prima
facie plausibility conferred here by the Principle of Credulity turns out to be
illusory. (Thanks to Mike Bergmann for suggesting this.)
53. Sennett, for example, explicitly concedes that there is prima facie support for the crucial inductive inference in Rowe’s argument, while rejecting
the inference by means of defeaters (“The Inscrutable Evil Defense,” p. 224).
54. “The Argument from Evil,” Philosophical Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of
Religion (1991), pp. 113–16, 125–27.
55. This might be construed as tantamount to saying that the goods we
know are a representative sample of the goods there are. At any rate, Rowe
(“A Second Look,” p. 267, note 17) and Howard-Snyder (“The Argument from
Inscrutable Evil,” p. 296) take it in this way. For some reservations concerning
this interpretation of Tooley’s intent, see Bergmann (“Skeptical Theism,” pp.
286–88).
56. “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” pp. 296–97.
57. According to Bergmann, Tooley’s argument for (2) “tells us only that
the goods we currently know of are representative of the goods likely to be
discovered by us. But no reason is given for thinking that the goods likely to
be discovered by us are representative of the goods there are” (“Skeptical Theism,” p. 288).
58. “The Argument from Evil,” pp. 113–14.
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59. Ibid., p. 114.
60. In fairness, I should note that Tooley says that he “cannot attempt to
argue the matter here” (Ibid.).
61. “The Empirical Argument from Evil,” p. 244.
62. “The Argument from Evil,” p. 113. Rowe quotes this passage approvingly (“William Alston on the Problem of Evil,” p. 92).
63. It is worth noting that many theists endorse the view that God’s reasons for permitting evil cannot exclude those who suﬀer. See, for example,
Marilyn Adams (Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, [Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1999], p. 31); Alston, (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,”
pp. 111); Hasker, (“The Sceptical Solution to the Problem of Evil,” pp. 49–50);
Eleonore Stump, (“Providence and the Problem of Evil” in Christian Philosophy,
ed. T. Flint, [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990], p. 66). But for
doubts about this restriction from a theist, see van Inwagen, “The Magnitude,
Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy,” Philosophical Topics 16 (1988),
pp. 161–87, and for a more general restriction, see Swinburne, Providence and
the Problem of Evil, p. 235.
64. In this passage, Tooley refers to goods beyond our ken, but it is more
precise to speak of theodicies beyond our ken (since, as explained in Section I,
an unknown theodicy might involve a known good).
65. “The Argument from Evil,” p. 127. Note that Tooley’s examples are
more general than his patient-centred restriction would suggest: his examples
concern humans surviving death, or having free will, but, strictly speaking, the
patient-centred restriction should be indexed to a particular suﬀerer. I take it,
though, that Tooley means to say all humans in this passage, in which case this
problem vanishes.
66. Although Tooley does not explicitly say so, I take it that condition C
may be a conjunction of two or more patient-centred restrictions. (Thanks to
Bill Hasker for pointing this out.) The burden of describing these restrictions
in detail, of course, rests with the defender of the argument from evil.
67. As I have expressed it, this argument is an abstract claim about some
patient-centred condition C. Rowe oﬀers an argument about a specific example
of a patient-centred restriction: he claims that any adequate theodicy for E2
would involve the conscious experiences of the patient (“The Empirical Argument
from Evil,” p. 244). Howard-Snyder replies to Rowe (in “The Argument from
Inscrutable Evil,” pp. 295–96), as does Bergmann (in “Skeptical Theism,” pp.
283–84). These replies are similar in spirit to my argument about condition C.
68. This is not a claim about patient-centred theodicies: in the passage quoted, Tooley makes only weaker claim that suﬀering must (or, must likely) benefit the individual, not the stronger claim that the good for the sake of which
the suﬀering is permitted must primarily involve the patient.
69. “Skeptical Theism,” p. 282. Strictly speaking, Rowe’s conclusion in this
passage is not that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. But Bergmann’s intention here is
not to explicate Rowe precisely; instead, his goal is to harness Rowe’s considerations in an argument for this conclusion.
70. “A Second Look,” p. 276.
71. This should not be taken to suggest that God exists and is silent. Rather,
S is shorthand for Rowe’s claim that “enormous numbers of human beings undergo prolonged, horrendous suﬀering without being consciously aware of any
such divine presence, concern, and explanations” (“A Second Look,” p. 276).
72. In the passage quoted, Rowe speaks only of goods beyond our ken,
but, again, it is more precise to speak of theodicies beyond our ken (since, as
explained in Section I, an unknown theodicy might nevertheless feature a
known good).
73. “Skeptical Theism,” p. 283.
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74. “Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann,” pp. 300–2.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid, 302. Here is Rowe’s defence of this claim in full:
To suppose that God exists and divine silence is what occurs in response
to the seemingly countless instances of horrendous suﬀering in our
world is to suppose all of the following:
1.

A being of infinite wisdom and power is unable to prevent any of
those instances of horrendous suﬀering without thereby forfeiting a
good1 so great that the world would be worse without good1, even
given the instance of horrendous suﬀering that must be permitted
by the infinitely powerful being if that being is to realize good1.

2.

A being of infinite wisdom and power is unable to enable those who
undergo such horrendous suﬀering to understand just what the
good1 is for which this infinitely powerful being is required to permit that horrendous suﬀering without this being thereby forfeiting a
good2 so great that the world would be worse without good2, even
given the additional suﬀering occasioned by the suﬀerers being unable to understand what the good1 is for which an infinitely powerful being permits them to undergo their horrendous suﬀering.

3.

A being of infinite wisdom and power is unable to be consciously
present to those who suﬀer horrendously, expressing his love and
concern during their period of suﬀering for a good1 that is beyond
their ken, without thereby forfeiting still another good, good3, such
that the world would be worse without good3, even given the despair and loneliness of those who undergo seemingly pointless
horrendous suﬀering without any conscious sense of God’s being
present, expressing his love and concern during their period of
seemingly pointless suﬀering for a good1 that is beyond their ken.

4.

A being of infinite wisdom and power is unable to enable those who
undergo horrendous suﬀering without any sense of God being consciously present expressing his love for them to have any understanding of just what the good3 is for which this being is required to permit
them to suﬀer without any conscious awareness of his love and concern without thereby forfeiting still another good, good4, such that
the world would be worse without good4, even given the additional
suﬀering occasioned by the suﬀerers and their loves ones being unable to understand what the good3 is for which an infinitely powerful
being permits them to undergo their horrendous suﬀering.

Now my position is that anyone who seriously reflects on (1)–(4) will see the
inherent implausibility in the idea that (1)–(4) is the way things are. . . . The
skeptical theist, however, may agree with me about the implausibility of this
idea. But she will say that its implausibility is derivative, not inherent. And
she will argue that we take the idea to be implausible only because we are
[objectionably] assuming that the way the goods we know of are related to the
evils we know of is representative of the way the goods there are are related
to the evils there are. . . . My reply is that the idea that (1)–(4) is the way things
are is an inherently implausible idea, not dependent for its implausibility on a
prior rejection of one or more skeptical theses.
77. Moreover, as Plantinga argues, if theism is true, it may not be fully
rational to “just see” this alleged inherent implausibility (Warranted Christian
Belief [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], pp. 485ﬀ.).
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78. “Sceptical Theism,” p. 504.
79. An argument in this vein was earlier advanced by Russell (“Defenseless,” pp. 197–98) and replied to by Alston (“Some [Temporarily] Final
Thoughts,” p. 321), Howard-Snyder (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,”
pp. 292–93), and Bergmann (“Skeptical Theism,” pp. 291–93). Bergmann (pp.
289–91) also considers related arguments concerning inappropriate skepticism due to Russell (“Defenseless,” pp. 196–97) and Gale (“Some Diﬃculties,”
pp. 208–209). Finally, Swinburne oﬀers an argument of this sort in Providence
and the Problem of Evil (pp. 27–28), and Hasker defends Swinburne in “The
Sceptical Solution to the Problem of Evil,” pp. 50–54. Space does not permit
detailed consideration of these moves. My view, however, is that my response
to the Almeida/Oppy argument can be deployed, mutatis mutandis, against
these variants of the claim that skeptical defences of theism spell trouble for
our ordinary moral reasoning.
80. “Sceptical Theism,” pp. 515–16.
81. Ibid., p. 507. This suggests that Almeida and Oppy intend to opt for the
second horn of the dilemma that Bergmann claims is faced by Russell’s similar
argument (“Skeptical Theism,” p. 293).
82. Ibid., pp. 506–507. Almedia and Oppy refer only to goods beyond our
ken, but this locution is shorthand: they intend it also to cover theodicies beyond out ken which involve known goods. (See p. 505, note 18.)
83. Ibid., p. 509.
84. Alston (“Some [Temporarily] Final Thoughts” p. 321) and HowardSnyder (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” pp. 292–93) oﬀer a reply in
this vein to a similar argument advanced by Russell (in “Defenseless”).
85. I take it that this move would be consistent with the spirit of Bergmann’s
remarks (“Skeptical Theism,” pp. 292–93). In terms of the inference from (P*)
to (Q*), the argument could be developed in the following manner: Given that
Almeida and Oppy intend this inference perfectly to mimic the move from
(P’) to (Q), and given that they agree that the latter move succeeds only if it is
reasonable to believe that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, we can construct a similar
necessary condition for the (P*)–(Q*) inference: it must be reasonable to believe
that Pr(P*/~Q*&k) is not high. But, someone might say, it is just not reasonable
to believe that this probability is not high. Hence it is not reasonable to infer
(Q*) from (P*). Hence our ordinary moral reasoning (still presumed here to be
generally successful) does not require such an inference.
Relatedly: in personal correspondence, Hasker suggests a defeater on the
inference from (P*) to (Q*). He imagines that “a very wise and good person,
one whom I have come to respect as a moral authority, tells me that I should
not intervene to prevent the evil in question. I would then have good reason
to think that there is some outweighing good that justifies me in permitting the
evil, but I would still have no idea what the good is. (To make this more compelling, suppose that “I” am only ten years old at the time.)” In short, Hasker
oﬀers a scenario on which, although it is reasonable to believe (P*), it may not
be reasonable to infer (Q*). In my revised model of moral reasoning, below, I
add a premise, (S), to cover cases of the sort Hasker imagines.
86. One could consistently advance both arguments.
87. Another model would replace “entitled” in (U) and (V) with “obliged.”
Many more models may readily be imagined.
88. The motivation for this premise is explained in note 85.
89. Two replies to this argument may be envisioned. The first suggests
that the argument for (V) damages the skeptical theist’s case, since it may be
retooled, in the following manner, to show that we are entitled to believe that
God is not justified in permitting E1 or E2:
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(P’) We know of no good state of aﬀairs’ being such that an omnipotent,
omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s
permitting E1 or E2.
(S’) We have no good reason to believe that there is a good state of affairs such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would
morally justify that being in permitting E1 or E2.
(T’) We have fulfilled our relevant epistemic and moral duties in considering whether there might be a good such that an omnipotent,
omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s
permitting E1 or E2.
(U’) If (P’) and (S’) and (T’), then we are entitled to believe that no good
state of aﬀairs’ is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitting E1 or E2.

Therefore,
(V’) We are entitled to believe that no good state of aﬀairs’ is such that an
omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify
that being’s permitting E1 or E2.
The problem with this argument, however, is that (U’) is false, or at the very least,
unavailable to Almeida and Oppy: they intend to oﬀer indirect support for the
claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high precisely because they recognize that our entitlement to believe that God has no good reason for permitting E1 and E2 requires
more than our not knowing any such reason, our not knowing that there is any
such reason, and our having looked carefully for such a reason. A more promising reply, I suppose, would be to claim that the argument for (V) is unsound,
because (U) is false. For example, Almeida and Oppy might urge that one cannot
justifiedly conclude (V) without first inferring (Q*) from (P*). Alternatively, they
might argue that (V) is inadequate to the task of underwriting the relevant sort
of moral reasoning. I doubt, however, that such arguments can succeed.
90. Thanks are due to Bernard D. Katz, Elmar Kremer, and Jordan Howard
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Society of Christian Philosophers (Eastern Division) Meeting, Asbury College, KY,
December 2003, and at the American Philosophical Association (Central Division)
Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 2004. Special thanks are due to Michael Bergmann,
Daniel Howard-Snyder, William Rowe, and Bruce Russell for their invaluable
comments and stimulating discussion at (and since) the 2004 Central APA. I
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